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We study the constrained Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy in which the
group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. We show that Pareto efficient
allocations take a quasi-Markovian structure and can be represented recursively as a function of the
identity of the group in power and updated Pareto weights. For high discount factors, the economy
converges to a first-best allocation in which labor supply decisions are not distorted and the levels
of labor supply and consumption are constant over time (though there may be transfers from one group
to another). For low discount factors, the economy converges to an invariant stochastic distribution
in which distortions do not disappear and labor supply and consumption levels fluctuate over time.
The labor supply of groups that are not in power are taxed in order to reduce the deviation payoff of
the party in power and thus relax the political economy/sustainability constraints. We also show that
the set of sustainable first-best allocations is larger when there is less persistence in the identity of
the party in power. This result contradicts a common conjecture that there will be fewer distortions
when the political system creates a “stable ruling group”. In contrast, political economy distortions
are less important when there are frequent changes in power (because this encourages compromise
between social groups). Despite this result, it remains true that distortions decrease along sample paths
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In this paper, we investigate (constrained) Pareto eﬃcient equilibria in an inﬁnite-horizon pro-
duction economy in which political power ﬂuctuates between diﬀerent social groups (“parties”).
These groups may correspond to social classes with diﬀerent incomes or to citizens living in
diﬀerent regions. The process for power ﬂuctuation is taken as given. Our objective is to under-
stand the implications of political economy frictions/constraints on the allocation of resources.
The key to political economy friction in our model is lack of commitment: the group currently
in power determines the allocation of resources (the allocation of total production across diﬀer-
ent groups in the society), and there are no means of making binding commitments to future
allocations. This political economy friction leads to an additional sustainability constraint for
the group in power, to ensure that it does not expropriate the available resources.
We characterize the (constrained) Pareto eﬃcient allocations in this economy. This focus
enables us to understand the implications of political economy frictions on “the best possible”
allocations, as clearly identifying the role of political economy in production and consumption
distortions.1 These allocations can be identiﬁed as the solution to an optimization problem
subject to the participation and sustainability constraints, with diﬀerent Pareto weights given
to the utilities of diﬀerent groups. We refer to allocations that involve full consumption smooth-
ing and no distortions as “ﬁrst best”. In these allocations, each individual supplies the same
amount of labor and receives the same level of consumption at every date, irrespective of which
group is in power. The sustainability constraints resulting from political economy imply that
ﬁrst-best allocations may not be supported because the group in power could prefer to deviate
from a ﬁrst-best allocation. In this case, Pareto eﬃcient allocations will involve distortions (in
the sense that marginal utility of consumption and disutility of labor are not equalized) and
consumption and labor will ﬂuctuate over time. We show that Pareto eﬃcient allocations have
1An alternative, complementary strategy is to focus on Pareto dominated equilibria that may emerge either
in our game or in some related institutional setting. Much of the political economy literature investigates the
role of speciﬁc institutions and thus implicitly focuses on such allocations. Such Pareto dominated allocations
will naturally induce further distortions relative to the allocations we characterize. While these distortions are
often important in practice, from a theoretical point of view they result not from the political economy friction
we are focusing on (the commitment problem of the group holding power), but from the additional institutional
characteristics leading to Pareto dominate outcomes.
In this light, our exercise can also be interpreted as characterizing the outcomes that would result if the
society could introduce speciﬁc institutional structures that would ensure the implementation of (constrained)
Pareto optimal allocations. However, our analysis in subsection 5.2 already gives some clues as to why we may
not always count on diﬀerent social groups agreeing to institute such arrangements.
1a quasi-Markovian structure and can be characterized recursively, conditional on the identity
of the group that is in power and Pareto weights. Dynamics are determined by updating the
Pareto weights recursively.
We present four sets of results. First, we characterize the structure of political economy
frictions as a function of the preference and production structure, the identity of the group
in power and the stochastic process regulating power switches. We show that as long as a
ﬁrst-best allocation is not sustainable at the current date, the labor supply (and production)
of individuals who belong to groups that are not in power will be distorted downwards–i.e.,
“taxed”. This downward distortion results from the sustainability constraints reﬂecting the
political economy considerations. Intuitively, an increase in production raises the amount that
the group in power can allocate to itself for consumption rather than allocating it among the
entire population. Reducing aggregate production relaxes the political economy constraints
and reduces the rents captured by the group in power. Since starting from an undistorted
allocation, the gain to society from rents to the ruling group is ﬁrst order, while the loss is
second-order, (non-ﬁrst-best) constrained Pareto eﬃciency allocations involve distortions and
underproduction.
The second set of results characterizes the dynamics of distortions. We ﬁrst show that
when discount factors are below some level ¯ 1,n oﬁrst best allocation is sustainable. Con-
sequently, distortions always remain, even asymptotically. In particular, we show that in this
case all Pareto allocations converge to an invariant non-degenerate distribution of consumption
and leisure across groups, whereby distortions as well as the levels of consumption and labor
supply for each group ﬂuctuate according to an invariant distribution. We then focus on the
special case with two social groups (two parties). In this environment we show that there exists
a level of the discount factor ˆ 1, such that when the common discount factor is greater
than ˆ ,t h e na n yP a r e t oe ﬃcient allocation path (meaning an eﬃcient allocation starting with
any Pareto weights) eventually reaches a ﬁrst-best allocation, and both distortions and ﬂuctu-
ations in consumption and labor supply disappear. Finally, we show that regardless of whether
ﬁrst-best allocations are sustainable or not, distortions decrease when the group remains in
power for longer. This is because the Pareto weight of a group increases the longer it remains
in power, and this, ultimately, translates into fewer distortions.
Our third set of result discusses a central question in political economy–whether a more
2stable distribution of political power (as opposed to frequent power switches between groups)
leads to “better public policies.” That is, whether it leads to policies involving lower distortions
and generating greater total output. A natural conjecture is that a stable distribution of
political power should be preferable because it serves to increase the “eﬀective discount factor”
of the group in power, thus making “cooperation” easier. This conjecture receives support from
a number of previous political economy analyses. For example, Olson (1993) and McGuire
and Olson (1996) contrast an all-encompassing long-lived dictator to a “roving bandit” and
conclude that the former will lead to better public policies than the latter. The standard
principal-agent models of political economy, such as Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), also reach the same conclusion, because it is easier to
provide incentives to a politician who is more likely to remain in oﬃce.
Our analysis shows that this conjecture is generally not correct (in fact, its opposite is
true). The conjecture is based on the presumption that incentives can be given to agents
only when they remain in power. Once a politician or a social group leaves power, it can
no longer be punished or rewarded for past actions. This naturally leads to the result that
there is a direct link between the eﬀective discount factor of a political agent and its likelihood
of staying in power. This presumption is not necessarily warranted, however. Members of
a social group can be rewarded not only when they are in power, but also after they have
left power. Consequently, the main role of whether power persists or not is not to aﬀect the
eﬀective discount factor of diﬀerent parties in power, but to determine their deviation payoﬀ.
Greater persistence implies better deviation payoﬀs; in contrast, in the ﬁrst best, there are
no ﬂuctuations in consumption and labor supply, thus along-the-equilibrium-path payoﬀsa r e
independent of persistence. This reasoning leads to the opposite of the McGuire and Olson
conjecture: more frequent power switches tend to reduce political economy distortions and
expand the set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations.2
Finally, using numerical analysis, we illustrate the relationship between persistence of power
and the structure of constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations. We verify the result that greater
persistence reduces the self sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations. However, we also show that an
2This claim does not contradict our above result that along a sample path in which a particular party remains
in power for a long time, distortions are decreasing. This is because the current claim concerns the relationship
between the set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations and the stochastic process for power switches, while the
above result referred to a realization of a sample path for a given stochastic process.
3increase in the frequency of power switches does not necessarily beneﬁt all parties. Interestingly,
greater persistence might harm–rather than beneﬁt–the party in power. This is because
with greater persistence, when power ﬁnally switches away from the current incumbent, the
sustainability constraint of the new government will be more binding, and this will necessitate
a bigger transfer away from the current incumbent in the future.
Our paper is related to the large and growing political economy literature.3 Several recent
papers also study dynamic political economy issues which is the focus of our paper. These
include, among others, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006a), Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin
(2008), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Hassler et al. (2003), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996),
Lagunoﬀ (2005, 2006), Roberts (1999) and Sonin (2003). The major diﬀerence of our paper
from this literature is our focus on Pareto eﬃcient allocations rather than Markov perfect
equilibria. Almost all of the results in the paper are the result of this focus (since Markovian
equilibria will involve zero production in this economy).
In this respect, our work is closely related to and builds on previous analyses of constrained
eﬃcient allocations in political economy models or in models with limited commitment. These
include, among others, the limited-commitment risk sharing models of Thomas and Worrall
(1990) and Kocherlakota (1996) and the political economy models of Dixit, Grossman and
Gul (2000) and Amador (2003a,b). The main diﬀerence between our paper and these previous
studies is our focus on the production economy. Several of our key results are derived from
the explicit presence of production (labor supply) decisions.4 In addition, to the best of our
knowledge, no existing work has systematically analyzed the impact of the Markov process for
power switches on the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations.5
The paper most closely related to our work is a recent and independent contribution by
Aguiar and Amador (2009), who consider an international political economy model in which a
party that comes to power derives greater utility from current consumption then groups not in
3See, among others, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 2000, Besley and
Coate, 1997, 1998, Baron, 1998, Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 1996, Dixit and Londergan, 1995, Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003.
4Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2008 a,b, 2009 a, b, and Yared, 2009, also consider dynamic political
economy models with production, but their models do not feature power switches between diﬀerent social groups.
Battaglini and Coate, 2008, in the context of debt policy consider a model of power switches.
5Acemoglu and Robinson 2006b and Robinson 2001 also question the insight that long-lived all-encompassing
regimes are growth-promoting. They emphasize the possibility that such regimes may block beneﬁcial techno-
logical or institutional changes in order to maintain their political power.
4power. Similar to our environment, there is also no commitment and the identity of the power
ﬂuctuates over time. Aguiar and Amador characterize a class of tractable equilibria, which
lead to ﬂuctuations in taxes on investment (expropriation), slow convergence to steady state
due to commitment problems, and potential diﬀerential responses to open this depending on
the degree of “political economy frictions” parameterized by the diﬀerence in the diﬀerential
utility from consumption for the group in power. In contrast to our model political economy
distortions disappear in the long run. In their model the backloading argument similar to
Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) applies as despite the current impatience the parties
agree on the long term allocations. Battaglini and Coate (2008) is also closely related, since
they investigate the implications of dynamic political economy frictions in a model with changes
in the identity of the group in power, though focusing on Markovian equilibria and implications
for debt and government expenditure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic environment
and characterizes the ﬁrst-best allocations. Section 3 describes the political economy game
and characterizes the level and dynamics of distortions. Section 4 provides a complete char-
acterization of the dynamics of distortions in the case with two parties. Section 5 studies the
eﬀect of frequency (persistence) of power switches on political economy distortions. Section 5.2
provides a numerical illustration. Section 6 concludes, while the Appendix contains a number
of technical details and proofs omitted from the text.
2 Environment and Benchmark
In this section, we introduce the model and describe eﬃcient allocations without political
economy constraints.
2.1 Demographics, Preferences and Technology
We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy in discrete time with a unique ﬁnal good. The economy





where  is consumption,  is labor supply (or other types of productive eﬀort), and E0
denotes the expectations operator at time  =0 . To simplify the analysis without loss of any





party. We also impose the following assumption on utility functions.
Assumption 1 (utility function) The instantaneous utility function





for  =1  is uniformly continuous, twice continuously diﬀerentiable in the interior of its
domain, strictly increasing in ,s t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi n and jointly strictly concave in  and ,




















= −∞ for all  ∈ R+
The diﬀerentiability assumptions enable us to work with ﬁrst-order conditions. The Inada
conditions ensure that consumption and labor supply levels are not at corners. The concavity
assumptions are also standard, but important for our results, since they create a desire for
consumption and labor supply smoothing over time.





2.2 Eﬃcient Allocation without Political Economy
As a benchmark, we start with the eﬃcient allocation without political economy constraints.
This is an allocation that maximizes a weighted average of diﬀerent groups’ utilities, with
Pareto weights vector denoted by α =( 1 ),w h e r e ≥ 0 for  =1  denotes
the weight given to party . We adopt the normalization
P
=1  =1 . The program for the






















 for all .( 4 )
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 for  =1  and all  (6)
The structure of the ﬁrst best allocations is standard. Eﬃciency requires the marginal
beneﬁt from additional consumption to be equal to the marginal cost of labor supply for each
individual, and also requires perfect consumption and labor supply smoothing.
Note that diﬀerent parties can be treated diﬀerently in the ﬁrst-best allocation depending
on the Pareto weight vector α, i.e., receive diﬀerent consumption and labor allocations.
3 Political Economy
3.1 Basics
We now consider a political environment in which political power ﬂuctuates between the 
parties  ∈ N ≡ {1}. The game form in this political environment is as follows.
1. In each period ,w es t a r tw i t ho n ep a r t y ,0,i np o w e r .












4. A ﬁrst-order Markov process  determines who will be in power in the next period. The
probability of party  being in power following party 0 is ( | 0),w i t h
P
=1 ( | 0)=
1 for all 0 ∈ N.
7A number of features is worth noting about this setup. First, this game form captures the
notion that political power ﬂuctuates between groups. Second, it builds in the assumption that
the allocation of resources is decided by the group in power (without any prior commitment
to what the allocation will be). The assumption of no commitment is standard in political
economy models (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a), while the
presence of power switches is crucial for our focus (see also Dixit, Grossman and Gul, 2000,
and Amador, 2003a,b). In addition, we have simpliﬁed the analysis by assuming that there are
no constraints on the allocation decisions of the group in power and by assuming no capital.
In addition, we impose the following assumption on the Markov process for power switches.
Assumption 2 (Markov process) The ﬁrst-order Markov chain ( | 0) is irreducible,
aperiodic and ergodic.
We are interested in subgame perfect equilibria of this inﬁnitely-repeated game. More
speciﬁcally, as discussed in the Introduction, we will look at subgame perfect equilibria that
correspond to constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations, which we refer to as Pareto eﬃcient
perfect equilibria.6
To deﬁne these equilibria, we now introduce additional notation. Let  =( 0 ),w i t h
 ∈ N be the history of power holdings. Let ∞ denote the set of all such possible histories

















be the history of allocation rules. A (complete) history of this





which describes the history of power holdings, all labor supply decisions, and all allocation
rules chosen by groups in power. Let the set of all potential date  histories be denoted by Ω.





and denote the set of intermediate-stage full histories by ˆ Ω. The diﬀerence between  and
ˆ  lies in the fact that the former does not contain information on labor supplies at time ,
6Throughout, by “Pareto eﬃcient,” we mean “constrained Pareto eﬃcient,” but we drop the adjective “con-
strained” to simplify the terminology.
8while the latter does. The latter history will be relevant at the intermediate stage where the
individual in power chooses the allocation rule.
We can now deﬁne strategies as follows. First deﬁne the following sequence of mappings
ˆ  =
³
ˆ 0ˆ 1ˆ 
´
and ˆ  =
³
ˆ 0 ˆ 1 ˆ 
´
,w h e r e




determines the level of labor a party will supply for every given history  ∈ Ω,a n d
ˆ  : ˆ Ω → R
+
a sequence of allocation rules, which a party would choose, if it were in power, for every given
intermediate-stage history ˆ  ∈ ˆ Ω, such that ˆ  satisﬁes the feasibility constraint (7). A date
 strategy for party  is 
 =
³
ˆ  ˆ 
´
 Denote the set of date  strategies by Σ.As t r a t e g y





:  =0 1
´
and the set of strategies is denoted by Σ.D e n o t et h e
expected utility of party  at time  as a function of its own and others’ strategies given history
 and intermediate-stage history ˆ  by

¡
− |  ˆ ¢

We next deﬁne various concepts of equilibria which we use throughout the paper.






:  =1  =0 1
´
such that ∗














− |  ˆ 
´
for all  ∈ Σ, for all
¡
 ˆ ¢
∈ Ω × ˆ Ω,f o ra l l =0 1and for all  ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 2 A Pareto eﬃcient perfect equilibrium at time  (following history ), ∗∗,i s











− |  ˆ 
´
for all ˆ  ∈ ˆ Ω and for all  ∈ N,w i t h
at least one strict inequality.
We will also refer to Pareto eﬃcient allocations as the equilibrium-path allocations that
result from a Pareto eﬃcient perfect equilibrium. To characterize Pareto eﬃcient allocations,
we will ﬁrst determine the worst subgame perfect equilibrium, which will be used as a threat
9against deviations from equilibrium strategies. These are deﬁned next. We write  = j
¡
¢
or  = j
¡
¢
if party  is in power at time  according to history (of power holdings) 





.A worst SPE for party  at time  following history  where  is a collection











− |  ˆ 
´
for all ˆ  ∈ ˆ Ω.
3.2 Preliminary Results
The next lemma describes the worst subgame perfect equilibrium. In that equilibrium, all
parties that are not in power in any given period supply zero labor and receive zero consump-
tion, while the party in power supplies labor and consumes all output to maximize its per
period utility in such a way that marginal utility from consumption is equated with marginal
disutility of labor.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The worst SPE for any party 00 is given by the




































for all ˆ  ∈ ˆ Ω.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that  is a best response for each party in all subgames when
other parties are playing .C o n s i d e r ﬁrst party  that is not in power (i.e., suppose that
party 0 6=  is in power) at history . Consider strategy  for party  that deviates from

 at time , and then coincides with 
 at all subsequent dates (following all histories). By
the one step ahead deviation principle, if 
 is not a best response for party , then there
exists such a strategy  that will give higher utility to this party. Note, ﬁr s tt h a tg i v e n
−,
for any ,p a r t y will always receive zero consumption (i.e., 
³

− |  ˆ 
´
=0 ), and
moreover under , this has no eﬀect on the continuation value of party . Therefore, at such




− |  ˆ ¢













− | +1 ˆ +1¢
| ¤

10for any such ,w h e r e () is the labor supply of party  at this history under the









is the continuation value of
this party from date  +1onwards, with the expectation taken over histories determining
power switches given current history . The second line follows in view of the fact that
since (00) = 0,w eh a v e(0  ()) ≤ 0, and since under any change in beha-
vior at  has no eﬀect on future play and  coincides with 




















. This establishes that
there is no proﬁtable deviations from 
 for any  not in power.
Next consider party  in power at history . Under , 0 = 0 =0for all 0 6= ,a n d
thus  = . Consider again strategy  for party  that deviates from 
 at time ,a n d
then coincides with 




− |  ˆ ¢























− | +1 ˆ +1¢
| ¤

for any such ,w h e r e () and  () are the labor supply and consumption of party 
at this history under strategy . The second line follows in view of the fact that 
 satisﬁes































the fact that under  the current deviation by party  has no eﬀect on future play and
 coincides with 
 from time  +1onwards). This establishes that there is no proﬁtable
deviations from 
 for the party in power. Therefore,  is a SPE. The proof is completed
by showing that  is also the worst SPE for any party . To see this, suppose that all 0 6= 
choose strategy 
− to minimize the payoﬀ of . Since power switches are exogenous, party 























− |  ˆ ¢
for any 
−, and thus  is the worst SPE. Intuitively, the worst equilibrium involves all groups
other than the one in power supplying zero labor, which minimizes the utility of the group
in power. The labor supply decisions constitute a best response, since following a deviation
all output is expropriated by whichever group is currently in power. Also note that the same
equilibrium is the worst equilibrium for all parties.
11We denote  
 () to be the expected payoﬀ of party  from period +1on, conditional on
history . Note that generally such utility diﬀers based on the history:  
 () 6=  
 (ˆ ) for
 6= ˆ . The reason is that the identity of party in power in period  determines the probability
of party  being in power in +1 When  satisﬁes Assumption 2, it can be further simpliﬁed,
since  
 () depends only on the identify of party in power 
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, an outcome of any Pareto eﬃcient




































































+ ˜  ˜ 
⎞
⎠ +  
0 (0) for 0 = j()
(12)
for some Pareto weights vector α =( 1 ).
Proof. We start by showing that (10)-(12) are necesary and suﬃcient conditions for any
allocation { ()  ()}

=1 that is an outcome of some SPE. First, we show that any allocation
{ ()  ()}

=1 that satisﬁes (10)-(12) is an outcome of some SPE. For any history  with

















 and ∗ ¡
¢
= 




















=  otherwise. For any  6= j() if () 6= ∗
()
(∗





12where the last inequality follows from (11) and that fact that (00) = 0.M o r e o v e r , f o r
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Therefore, ∗ is an equilibrium.
The necessity of (10)-(12) is straightforward. Condition (10) is feasibility constraint. In






This implies in particular that
(∗
∗
−|) ≥  ( ()  ()) + E(∗
−|+1)
≥  (0  ()) +  
 (j())
=  (00) +  
 (j())
Since  (00) = 0, it implies (11). Similarly, for 0 = j() best response implies
0(∗
0∗
























+ ˜ ˜ 
⎞
⎠ +  
0 (0)
which is condition (12).
To see that ∗ is a Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium, suppose there is any other equilibrium ∗∗
that Pareto dominates ∗ Since ∗∗ is a SPE,
(∗∗
 ∗∗
−|) ≥  
 ()













+ ˜ ˜ 
⎞
⎠ +  
0 (0)
13Therefore, the outcome of ∗∗ must satisfy (10)-(12). But then the value of (9) would be higher
under the outcome of ∗∗ than under ∗, a contradiction.





























The diﬀerence between (−1) and [−1] is that the former denotes expected lifetime
utility of party  in period  before the uncertainty which party is in power in that period is real-
ized, while the latter denotes the expected lifetime utility after realization of this uncertainty.





Proposition 1 implies that in order to characterize the entire set of Pareto eﬃcient perfect
equilibria, we can restrict attention to strategies that follow a particular prescribed equilibrium
play, with the punishment phase given by . Notice, however, that this proposition applies
to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes, not to the strategies that individuals use in order to support
these outcomes. These strategies must be conditioned on information that is not contained
in the history of power holdings, , since individuals need to switch to the worst subgame
perfect equilibrium in case there is any deviation from the implicitly-agreed action proﬁle.
This information is naturally contained in . Therefore, to describe the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies we need to condition on the full histories .
The maximization (9) subject to (10), (11), and (12) is a potentially non-convex optimiz-
ation problem, because (12) deﬁnes a non-convex constraint set. This implies that randomiz-
ations may improve the value of the program (see, for example, Prescott and Townsend, 1984
a,b). Randomizations can be allowed by either considering correlated equilibria rather than
subgame perfect equilibria, or alternatively, by assuming that there is a commonly observed
randomization device on which all individuals can coordinate their actions. In the Appendix,
we will formulate an extended problem by introducing a commonly-observed, independently
and identically distributed random variable, which all individual strategies can be conditioned
14upon. We will show that this does not change the basic structure of the problem and in fact
there will be randomizations over at most two points at any date, and the history of past
randomizations will not play any role in the characterization of Pareto eﬃcient allocations.
Since introducing randomizations complicates the notation considerably, in the text we do not
consider randomizations (thus implicitly assuming that the problem is convex for the relevant
parameters). The equivalents of the main results are stated in the Appendix for the case with
randomizations.
We next present our main characterization result, which shows that the solution to the
maximization problem in Proposition 1 can be represented recursively.
3.3 Recursive Characterization
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne 
¡
+ | ¢
to be the (conditional) probability of history + at time +
given history  at time  a c c o r d i n gt ot h eM a r k o vp r o c e s s( | 0).M o r e o v e r ,d e ﬁne 
¡
¢




for the unconditional probability of history +.



































































is the Lagrange multiplier on the sus-
tainability constraint, (12), for party  for history ,a n d( ) ≡ max˜  
³
 + ˜ ˜ 
´
 The
restriction that  ∈ 
¡
−1¢
is implicit in this expression.












































































with the normalization 
¡
∅¢
=0for all  ∈ N.















0 + 0 (−1)
¢ (15)
can be interpreted as updated Pareto weights. Therefore, after history −1, the problem
is equivalent to maximizing the sum of utilities with these weights (subject to the relevant
constraints). The problem of maximizing (14) is equivalent to choosing current consumption
and labor supply levels for each group and also updated Pareto weights {}

=1.










i.e., whenever group  is not in power. This is because there is no sustainability constraint for
a group that is not in power. This also implies that in what follows, we can drop the subscript






, since the information on which group is in power is
already incorporated in .
This analysis establishes the following characterization result:
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the constrained eﬃcient allocation has a















, i.e., only on updated weights and the identity of the
group in power.
16Proof. The proof of this theorem builds on the representation suggested by Marcet and








































































































 | ∅¢  X
=1






































Since after history −1 has elapsed, all terms in the last two lines are given, maximizing L00 is
equivalent to maximizing (14).
Given the structure of problem (14), the result that optimal allocations only depend on
{ ()}

=1 and j() then follows immediately. In the Appendix, we prove a generalized version
of this theorem, Theorem 6, that allows for randomizations.
The result in this theorem is intuitive. When the sustainability constraint for the party in
power is binding, the discounted value of this party needs to be increased so as to satisfy this
constraint. This is typically done by a combination of increasing current and future utility.
The latter takes the form of increasing the Pareto weight of the party in power, corresponding
to a move along the constraint Pareto eﬃcient frontier.
It is also worth noting that the existence of a recursive formulation for the problem of
characterizing the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations also has an obvious parallel to the general
recursive formulation provided by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) for repeated games
17with imperfect monitoring. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 is not a direct corollary of their results,
since it establishes that this recursive formulation depends on updated Pareto weights and
the identity of the group in power, and shows how these weights can be calculated from past
realizations of the history .
Theorem 1 allows us to work with a recursive problem, in which we only have to keep
track of the identity of the party that is in power and updated Pareto weights. Moreover,
the analysis preceding the theorem shows that the Pareto weights are updated following the
simple formula (15), which is only a function of the Lagrange multiplier on the sustainability
constraint of the party in power at time . The recursive characterization implies that we can
express (−1) and [−1] as (α) and [α].
3.4 Characterization of Distortions
We now characterize the structure of distortions arising from political economy. Our ﬁrst result
shows that as long as sustainability/political economy constraints are binding, the labor supply
of parties that are not in power is distorted downwards. There is a positive wedge between
their marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of labor. In contrast, there is no
wedge for the party in power. Recall also that without political economy constraints, in the
ﬁrst best allocations, the distortions are equal to zero.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then as long as 
¡
¢
 0,t h el a b o r
supply of all groups that are not in power, i.e.,  6= j
¡
¢






















The labor supply of a party in power, 0 = j
¡
¢





















Proof. This results follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problem in



























A comparison with the equalities in (5) shows that these inequalities correspond to downward
distortions. The result about the group in power is obtained analogously.
18The intuition for why there will be downward distortions in the labor supply of groups
that are not in power is similar to that in Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a). Positive
distortions, which are the equivalent of “taxes,” discourage labor supply, reducing the amount
of output that the group in power can “expropriate” (i.e., allocate to itself as consumption
following a deviation). This relaxes the sustainability constraint (12). In fact, starting from an
allocation with no distortions, a small distortion in labor supply creates a second-order loss.
In contrast, as long as the multiplier on the sustainability constraint is positive, this small
distortion creates a ﬁrst-order gain in the objective function, because it enables a reduction
in the rents captured by the group in power. This intuition also highlights that the extent
of distortions will be closely linked to the Pareto weights given to the group in power. In
particular, when  is close to 1 and group  is in power, there will be little gain in relaxing
the sustainability constraint (12). In contrast, the Pareto eﬃcient allocation will attempt to
provide fewer rents to group  when  is low, and this is only possible by reducing the labor
supply of all other groups, thus distorting their labor supplies.
Two immediate but useful corollaries of Proposition 2 are as follows:




, is a measure of distortions.
This corollary follows immediately from Theorem 2, and more explicitly from Section 7.1
in the Appendix, which shows that the wedges between the marginal utility of consumption
and the marginal disutility of labor are directly related to 
¡
¢
. This corollary is useful as





A related implication of Proposition 2 is that constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations will be
“ﬁrst-best” if and only if the Lagrange multipliers associated with all sustainability constraints
are equal to zero (so that there are no distortions in a ﬁrst-best allocation).
Corollary 2 A ﬁrst-best allocation starting at history  involves 
¡
+¢





193.5 Dynamics of Distortions
Proposition 2 states that when the Lagrange multipliers are positive, the allocations are dis-
torted. We now study the evolution of the Largrange multipliers and distortions resulting from
the sustainability constraints.
Our ﬁrst result in this subsection is an immediate implication of the recursive formulation
in Theorem 1, but it will play an important role in our results. The lemma that follows shows
that if a group is in power today, then in the next period its updated Pareto weight must be
weakly higher than today.
Lemma 2 If j
¡
+1¢







Proof. This follows immediately from equation (15) observing that if j
¡
+1¢







=0for all  6= 0.
This lemma implies that as long as party  remains in power, its Pareto weight is increasing.
We assume the following condition holds.








⎠ +  
 ()
where ˜  is a labor supply of party  in equilibrium in the state (α)
Although Assumption 1 is stated in terms of the endogenous objects, it is easy to see that
it will be satisﬁed unless the discount factor is too low. An implication of Lemma 2 is that
when a particular party remains in power for suﬃciently long, the Lagrange multipliers on the
sustainability constraints and distortions begin declining.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and Condition 1 hold. Then for any 0 there exists






=  for  =1 ,t h e n
¡
+¢
for all  ≥ 
















∈ [01] for each  and all +. Consequently, 
¡
+¢
→ ¯ .N e x t n o t e t h a t
¯   1. To see this note that the inspection of the maximization problem (14) shows that
20when ¯  =1 , the constraint (12) is slack. Since the objective function is continuous in the
vector of Pareto weights α, this implies that for  =1−  with  suﬃciently small, the
constraint is also slack and 
¡
+¢




 1 − , we cannot have 
¡
+1¢
=1for any , since from equation
(15) this would imply that 
¡
+¢
= ∞, which is not possible. Next equation (15) also
implies that if 
¡
+¢
=0 ,t h e n
¡
+¢







for all  ∈ N). Therefore, 
¡
+¢










→ 0 and thus 
¡
+¢
→ 0 (by virtue of
the fact that ¯   1).
Intuitively, along the path in which a particular group remains in power for a long time,
distortions ultimately decline. This is because as a particular group remains in power for a long
time, its Pareto weight increases suﬃciently and the allocations do not need to be distorted to
satisfy the sustainability constraint.
The major result in Theorem 2 is that as a particular group remains in power longer,
distortions eventually decline. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that when the group in
power has a higher updated Pareto weight, then there is no need to distort allocations as much.
In the limit, if the group in power had a weight equal to 1, then the Pareto eﬃcient allocation
would give all consumption to individuals from this group, and therefore, there would be no
reason to distort the labor supply of other groups in order to relax the sustainability constraint
and reduce rents to this group. Put diﬀerently, recall that distortions (and ineﬃciencies) arise
because the group in power does not have a suﬃciently high Pareto weight and the Pareto
eﬃcient allocation reduces its consumption by reducing total output and thus relaxing its
sustainability constraint. As a group remains in power for longer, its updated Pareto weight
increases and as a result, there is less need for this type of distortions. This reﬂects itself in a
reduction in the Lagrange multiplier associated with the sustainability constraint.
Theorem 2 also suggests a result reminiscent to the conjecture discussed in the Introduction;
greater political stability translates into lower ineﬃciencies and better public policies. This
conclusion does not follow from the theorem, however. The theorem is for a given sample path
(holding the Markov process regulating power switches ﬁxed). The conjecture linking political
stability to eﬃcient public policy refers to a comparison of the extent of distortions for diﬀerent
underlying Markov processes governing power switches. We will be discuss such comparison
21in greater detail in Section 5.
Theorem 2 does not answer the question of whether distortions will ultimately disappear–
i.e., whether we will have 
¡
¢
=0for all  after some date. More formally, we call any
allocation {∗
∗
} a sustainable ﬁrst-best allocation if {∗
∗


















⎠ +  
 () for all  (17)
The next theorem addresses this question.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists ¯  with 0  ¯ 1
such that
(a) For all  ≥ ¯ ,t h e r ei ss o m eﬁrst-best allocation that is sustainable;
(b) For all ¯ ,n oﬁrst-best allocation is sustainable, and {() ()} converges to an
invariant non-degenerate distribution .
Proof. See the Appendix.
This theorem therefore shows that for high discount factors, i.e.,  ≥ ¯ , ﬁrst-best allocations
will be sustainable. However, when ¯ , then there will be permanent ﬂuctuations in
consumption and labor supply levels as political power ﬂuctuates between diﬀerent parties.
The invariant distribution can be quite complex in general, with the history of power holdings
shaping consumption and labor supply levels of each group.
This theorem does not answer the question of whether ﬁrst-best allocations, when they are
sustainable, will be ultimately reached. We address this question for the case of two parties in
the next section.
4T h e C a s e o f T w o P a r t i e s
In this section, we focus on an economy with two parties (rather than  parties as we have
done so far). We also specialize utility function to be quasi-linear. Under these conditions, we
show that when there exists a sustainable ﬁrst-best allocation (i.e., an undistorted allocations
for some Pareto weights), the equilibrium will necessarily converge to a point in the set of ﬁrst-
best allocations. More speciﬁcally, starting with any Pareto weights, the allocations ultimately
converge to undistorted allocations.
22For the rest of this section, we impose the following assumption on the preferences.
Assumption 3 (quasi-linearity) The instantaneous utility of each party  satisﬁes
 ( −  ())
with the normalization
0
 (1) = 1 (18)
Assumption 3 implies that there are no income eﬀects in labor supply. Consequently, when
there are no distortions, the level of labor supply by each group will be constant, and given
the normalization in (18), this labor supply level will be equal to 1.
Under Assumption 3, Theorem 2 implies that as a particular group remains in power for a
suﬃciently long time, overall output in the economy will increase (since there are no income
eﬀects, lower distortions translate into higher labor supply levels). The absence of income
eﬀects also simpliﬁes the analysis and dynamics, which is our main focus in this section.
We now state and prove three lemmas, which together will enable us to establish our main
result in this section Theorem 4.
We ﬁrst show that the party with a higher Pareto weight will receive higher value.
Lemma 3 For any two vectors of Pareto weights 0,i f  0
 then  [] ≥  [0] for
 ∈ {12}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let  =1  Optimality implies


















































23Suppose that 1 []  1 [0] Then (19) implies that 2 []  2 [0]. But this is
impossible, because then (1 [0] 2 [0]) would Pareto dominate (1 [] 2 [])
Let ∗ =( ∗
1 ∗
2) be a vector of the Pareto weights for which ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o ni s
sustainable. Consider any other initial vector 0 6= ∗and suppose that the ﬁrst best allocation
that corresponds to that vector is not sustainable. This implies that at least for one party the
sustainability constraint (12) binds. The next lemma shows that sustainability constraint (12)
does not bind if any party has a Pareto weight higher that ∗
. While the proof of the lemma
is somewhat involved, the intuition for the result is straightforward. If a party has a Pareto
weight higher than the sustainable ﬁrst best weight, the planner is treating such agent better
than in the sustainable allocation. Therefore, when in power the sustainability constraint does
not bind.


















Proof. Let us consider the relaxed problem of maximizing (9) without the constraint (12)




. We will characterize the solution to this relaxed











Without loss of generality assume that  =1 . The expected utility of party 1 in history 




















































1 + 2 ≤ 1 + 2






















24Since Pareto weights ∗ correspond to the sustainable allocation,
1 (1 (∗) 1 (∗)) +  ((1|1)1 [∗1] + (2|1)1 [∗2])
≥1 (2 (∗)) +  
1 (1) (20)



































1 this inequality is
satisﬁed.
The previous lemma established that if party  is in power and has an updated Pareto
weight above ∗
, its next period updated Pareto weight remains the same. The next key
step in our argument is to show that if a party has Pareto weight is below ∗
,i t sn e x tp e r i o d
updated Pareto weight is also below ∗
 (even if its current sustainability constraint is binding).












 for all subsequent .
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma is the key to the main result in this section. It shows that if the sustainability
constraint does not hold for group  that is in power even though its Pareto weight is below
∗
, then for all subsequent histories its Pareto weight will not exceed ∗
. The proof utilizes
quasi-linearity of preferences to put structure on updated Pareto weights and the corresponding
allocations.
Now we are ready to prove the most important result of this section about the convergence
to the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n s .





















is a ﬁrst best sustainable allocation.
25Proof. Suppose the ﬁrst best allocation with Pareto weight ∗ is sustainable. Without












must converge. Such convergence
is possible only if (12) does not bind for both parties, which is possible only for the ﬁrst best
sustainable allocation.
This theorem establishes that if there exist ﬁrst-best allocations that are sustainable they
will be ultimately reached. This implies that the political economy frictions in this situation
will disappear in the long run. The resulting long-run allocations will not feature distortions
and ﬂuctuations in consumption and labor supply. Note, however, that the theorem does not
imply that such ﬁrst-best allocations will be reached immediately. Sustainability constraints
may bind for a while, because the sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations may involve too high a level
of utility for one of the groups. In this case, a ﬁrst-best allocation will be reached only after a
speciﬁc path of power switches increases the Pareto weight of this group to a level consistent
with a ﬁrst-best allocation. After this point, sustainability constraints do not bind for either
party, and thus Pareto weights are no longer updated and the same allocation is repeated
in every period thereafter. Interestingly, however, this ﬁrst-best allocation may still involve
transfer from one group to another.
5 Political Stability and Eﬃciency
Our framework enables an investigation of the implications of persistence of power on the
sustainability of ﬁrst-best applications. In particular, the “stability” or persistence of power is
captured by the underlying Markov process for power switches. If the Markov process ( | 0)
m a k e si tv e r yl i k e l yt h a to n eo ft h eg r o u p s ,s a yg r o u p1 ,w i l lb ei np o w e ra l lt h et i m e ,w ec a n
think of this as a very “stable distribution of political power”.
Such an investigation is important partly because a common conjecture in the political
economy literature is that such stable distributions of political power are conducive to better
policies. For example Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996) reach this conclusion by
contrasting an all-encompassing long-lived dictator to a “roving bandit”. They argue that a
dictator with stable political power is superior to a roving bandit and will generate better
public policies. This conjecture at ﬁrst appears plausible, even compelling: what matters for
better policies are high “eﬀective discount factors,” and frequent switches in the identity of
26powerholders would reduce these eﬀective discount factors. Hence, stability (persistence) of
power should be conducive to better policies and allocations. Similar insights emerge from the
standard principal-agent models of political economy, such as Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986),
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), because, in these models, it is easier to provide
incentives to a politician who is more likely to remain in power. We next investigate whether
a similar result applies in our context. In particular, we ask which types of Markov processes
make it more likely that a large set of ﬁrst-best allocations are sustainable.
Our main result in this section is that this common conjecture is not generally correct,
and that in particular, in our framework, essentially the opposite of this conjecture holds. We
show this in two parts. In the next subsection, we show that the opposite of this conjectures
is true for the set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations; greater persistence of power encourages
deviations and leads to a smaller set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations. We then investigate
how changes in persistence of power inﬂuences the utility of diﬀerent players.
5.1 The Set of Sustainable First-Best Allocations
In this subsection, we show that higher persistence of power makes distortions more likely, in
the sense that it leads to a smaller set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations. This result is stated
in the next theorem. In this subsection, we again consider a general setup ( parties and non
quasi-linear utilities).
Theorem 5 Consider an economy consisting of  groups, with group  having utility functions
 ( ) satisfying Assumption 1. Suppose that ( | )= and (0 | )=( 1−)( −1)
for any 0 6= .T h e n¯  is increasing in , i.e., the set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations is
smaller when  is greater.
Proof. Recall that a ﬁrst-best allocation satisﬁes (17). The left-hand side of this expression
is independent of ,s oi st h eﬁrst term on the right-hand side. Therefore, the desired result
follows if the second term on the right-hand side,  
 (),i si n c r e a s i n gi n, i.e., if (20) holds
for any pair (), then it holds for any (0) with 0 ≤ , and thus the threshold ¯  () about
which it holds is increasing in .
We now prove that this is the case. From the speciﬁcation of the power switching process,





 +( 1− ) 
  (21)
where  
 and  
 are respectively the utility of being in power and not in power after a

























where ˜  solves (8). Subtracting the second equation from the ﬁrst, we obtain
 


















































which is increasing in , establishing the desired result.
This theorem implies the converse of the Olson conjecture discussed above: the set of
sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations is maximized when there are frequent power switches between
diﬀerent groups. The Olson conjecture is based on the idea that “eﬀective discount factors”
are lower with frequent power switches, and this should make “cooperation” more diﬃcult.
“Eﬀective discount factors” would be the key factor in shaping cooperation (the willingness of
the party in power to refrain from deviating) only if those in power can only be rewarded when
in power. This is not necessarily the case, however, in reality or in our model. In particular,
in our model deviation incentives are countered by increasing current utility and the Pareto
weight of the party in power, and, all else equal, groups with higher Pareto weights will receive
greater utility in all future dates. This reasoning demonstrates why “eﬀective discount factor”
is not necessarily the appropriate notion in this context. Instead, Theorem 5 has a simple
28intuition: the value of deviation for a group in power is determined by the persistence of
power; when power is highly persistent, deviation becomes more attractive, since the group
in power can still obtain relatively high returns following a deviation as it is likely to remain
in power. In contrast, with more frequent power switches, the group in power is likely to be
out of power tomorrow, eﬀectively reducing deviation value. Since ﬁrst-best allocations, and
thus ﬁrst-best utilities, are independent of the persistence of power, this implies that greater
persistence makes deviation more attractive relative to candidate ﬁrst-best allocations, and
thus ﬁrst-best allocations become less likely to be sustainable.
5.2 Numerical Illustration: The Form of the Pareto Frontier
In this subsection, we numerically investigate the eﬀect of persistence and frequency of power
switches on the structure of constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations. In particular, we study
how both the ex-ante Pareto frontier, which applies before the identity of the party in power
is revealed, and the ex-post Pareto frontier, conditional on the identity of the party in power,
vary with the degree of persistence. Our purpose is not to undertake a detailed calibration,
but to provide illustrative numerical computations. We focus on an economy with two groups,
 =1 2, and further simplify the discussion by assuming quasi-linear and identical utilities,
given by










We set  =1 ,  =0 6 and choose a symmetric Markov process for power switches with
(1|1) = (2|2) = ,s ot h a t is the persistence parameter (higher  corresponds to greater
persistence). In Figure 1, we focus on the ex-ante Pareto frontier. For any given Pareto weight









The ﬁgure plots  
2 [] and  
1 [] for diﬀerent values of  and for two diﬀerent values of
levels of the persistence, ,  =0 9 represented by the inner solid line, and  =0 6 shown as
the dashed line. We also show the ﬁrst-best Pareto frontier for comparison (the outer solid
line). We chose a discount factor  so that only one ﬁrst best allocation (that corresponding
to the Pareto weights 1 = 2 =0 5 is sustainable) when  =0 9.






















Consistent with Theorem 5, a larger set of ﬁrst best allocations is sustainable when per-
sistence is lower. This can be seen by observing the common part of the ﬁrst-best frontier
and two other frontiers. For  =0 6 this common part is larger than for  =0 9 (which is
just one point corresponding to 1 = 2 =0 5). Also, the whole ex-ante Pareto frontier for
low persistence lies above the Pareto frontier for high persistence, which implies that, before
uncertainty about the identity of the party in power is realized, both parties are better oﬀ,
and would prefer to be, in a regime with frequent power switches.
If the institutional characteristics of the society determining the frequency of power switches
were chosen “behind the veil of ignorance,” then this result would imply that both parties
would prefer lower persistence. However, most institutional characteristics in practice are not
determined behind a veil of ignorance. Diﬀerent groups would typically have diﬀerent amounts
of political power, and in the context of our model, one would be “in power”. In this case,
what would be relevant is the ex-post not be ex-ante Pareto frontier, and we next turn to
the ex-post Pareto frontier. This is shown in Figure 2, assuming that party 1 is currently in
30power. As with Figure 1, this ﬁgure also plots 2 [1] against  1 [1] for diﬀerent values
of , and for high and low levels of persistence ( =0 9 and  =0 6). Figure 2 ﬁrst shows
that higher persistence imposes a greater “lower bound” on the possible payoﬀ of party 1,
which is in power. This can be seen from the fact that the beginning of the right solid line
( =0 6) starts lower than the beginning of the left line ( =0 9). This implies that greater
persistence decreases the highest payoﬀ that party 2 can get. The more surprising pattern in
Figure 2 is that for high values of ,t h ev a l u eo fp a r t y1i slower with higher persistence. This
appears paradoxical at ﬁrst, since higher persistence improves the deviation value of party 1.
We investigate the reason for this pattern in greater detail in Figure 3.





















Figure 3 plots the payoﬀ of party 1,  1 [1],f o rd i ﬀerent values values of 1. The line
representing the ﬁrst best allocation is monotonically increasing with the Pareto weight as-
signed to party 1. Figure 3 also shows that for 1 suﬃciently high, party 1 obtains higher
value with lower persistence (for 1  12, the line representing  =0 9 is below the dashed
line representing  =0 6). The reason for this is as follows. When 1 is suﬃciently high, the
sustainability constraint of party 1 is slack. Thus greater persistence does not necessitate an
31increase in current consumption or Pareto weight to satisfy its sustainability constraint. But it
implies that the deviation value of party 2 will also be higher when it comes to power. When
party 2 comes to power, its Pareto weight will be low and thus its sustainability constraint will
be binding. A greater deviation value for party 2 at this point therefore translates into higher
utility for it and lower utility for party 1. The anticipation of this lower utility in the future is
the reason why the value of party 1 is decreasing in the degree of persistence in power switches
for 1 suﬃciently high (greater than 1/2 in the ﬁgure). The analogue of this argument holds
for weights below 1/2. Consistent with Figure 2, for low initial Pareto weights the utility of
party 1 is increasing in the degree of persistence  (for 1  12, the line representing  =0 9
is above the dashed line representing  =0 6). Here, higher persistence of power increases
the value of deviation and requires the planner to allocate more utility for this party with a
low initial Pareto weight. This reasoning explains why the “lower bound” on the equilibrium
payoﬀs for party 1 is higher with high persistence.
Another important implication of Figure 3 (already visible from Figure 2) is that changes
in persistence do not necessarily correspond to Pareto improvements once the identity of the
party in power is known. This highlights that even though the set of sustainable ﬁrst-best
allocations expands when the degree of persistence declines, along-the-equilibrium-path utility
of both parties (conditional on the identity of the party in power) need not increase. This
suggests that we should not necessarily expect a strong tendency for societies to gravitate
towards institutional settings that increase the frequency of power switches.
















Conditioned on power, high  
Conditioned on power, low  
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations in a dynamic production
economy in which the group in power decides the allocation of resources. The environment is a
simple model of political economy. In our model, diﬀerent groups have conﬂicting preferences
and, at any given point in time, one of the groups has the political power to decide (or to
inﬂuence) the allocation of resources. We made relatively few assumptions on the interactions
between the groups; the process of power switches between groups is modeled in a reduced-
form way with an exogenous Markov process. Our focus has been on the allocations that can
be achieved given the distribution and ﬂuctuations of political power in this society–rather
than potential institutional failures leading to Pareto dominated equilibria given the underlying
process of power switches. This focus motivated our characterization of (constrained) Pareto
eﬃcient equilibria. In the constrained Pareto eﬃcient equilibria, there are well-deﬁned political
economy distortions that change over time.
33The distortions in constrained Pareto eﬃcient equilibria are a direct consequence of the
sustainability constraints, which reﬂect the political economy interactions in this economy.
If these sustainability constraints are not satisﬁe d ,t h eg r o u pi np o w e rw o u l da l l o c a t ea l l
production to itself. The results here are driven by the location and shape of the Pareto
frontier and by the “power” of diﬀerent groups, which corresponds to what point the society
is located along the Pareto frontier.
We showed how the analysis in the paper is simpliﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e s eP a r e t oe ﬃcient
allocations take a quasi-Markovian structure and can be represented recursively as a function
of the identity of the group in power and updated Pareto weights. This recursive formulation
allows us to provide a characterization of the level and dynamics of taxes and transfers in the
economy.
We demonstrated that for high discount factors the economy converges to a ﬁrst-best
allocation in which there may be transfers between groups, but labor supply decisions are not
distorted and the levels of labor supply and consumption do not ﬂuctuate over time. When
discount factors are low, the economy converges to an invariant stochastic distribution in which
distortions do not disappear and labor supply and consumption levels ﬂuctuate over time, even
asymptotically.
We also showed that the set of sustainable ﬁrst-best allocations is “decreasing” in the de-
gree of persistence of the Markov process for power change. This result directly contradicts
a common conjecture that there will be fewer distortions when the political system creates a
stable ruling group (see, e.g., Olson, 1993, or McGuire and Olson, 1996, as well as the stand-
ard principle-agent models of political economy such as Barro, 1973, Ferejohn, 1986, Persson,
Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 2000). The reason why this conjecture is incorrect illustrates an
important insight of our approach. In an economy where the key distributional conﬂict is
between diﬀerent social groups, these groups can be rewarded not only when they hold power,
but also when they are out of power (and they engage in consumption and production). Con-
sequently, the probability of power switches does not directly aﬀect “eﬀective discount factors”
and potentially invalidating the insight on which this conjecture is based. Because the persist-
ence of the Markov process for power switches reduces deviation payoﬀs( w h i l eﬁrst-best payoﬀs
are independent of persistence), greater persistence makes ﬁrst-best allocations less like you
to be sustainable. Nevertheless, it remains true that distortions decrease along sample paths
34where a particular group remains in power for a longer span of time (holding the underlying
stochastic process for power switch is constant). This is because as a particular group remains
longer in power, its Pareto weight increases and ultimately makes its sustainability constraint
slack, thus removing the labor supply distortions on other groups.
While our analysis focused on the distortions introduced by the political economy friction,
it is straightforward to derive implications of these results for tax policy. If the group in
power sets taxes and transfers rather than directly deciding allocations, then the constrained
Pareto eﬃcient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium, but this would
necessarily involve the use of distortionary taxes. This observation implies that the ﬂuctuations
of distortions, consumption and labor supply levels derived as part of the Pareto eﬃcient
allocations in this paper also correspond to ﬂuctuations in taxes–not simply to the presence
of and ﬂuctuations in “wedges” between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
disutility of labor. The result that distortionary taxes must be used to decentralize the Pareto
eﬃcient allocation has a simple intuition, for clarifying the source of distortions in our economy:
distortionary taxes must be used in order to discourage labor supply, because greater labor
supply would increase the amount of output at the group in power can expropriate, tightening
its sustainability constraint. Starting from an undistorted allocation, a small increase in taxes
(distortions) would have a second-order cost in terms of lost net output, while having a ﬁrst-
order beneﬁt in terms of relaxing the sustainability constraint when the latter is binding (see
also Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2008a).
We believe that the framework studied here is attractive both because we can analyze
the eﬀect of political economy distortions without specifying all of the details of interactions
between groups and the process of decision-making. Undoubtedly, these institutional details
are important in practice, and may lead to the emergence of outcomes inside the constrained
eﬃcient Pareto frontier. A natural next step is then to investigate what types of institutional
structures can support (“implement”) the constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations. This would
give a diﬀerent perspective on the role of speciﬁc institutions, as potential tools regulating the
allocation of political power in society and placing constraints on the exercise of such power so
as to achieve constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations. Nevertheless, our results indicating that
changes in the frequency of power switches that improve ex-ante welfare do not necessarily
improve ex-post welfare for all groups suggest that even when such speciﬁc institutions imple-
35menting constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations exist, whether they will emerge in equilibrium
needs to be studied in the context of well-speciﬁed models. We leave an investigation of these
issues to future work. Another important area for future research is to endogenize the Markov
process for power switches. In modern societies, ﬂuctuations of political power between diﬀer-
ent groups arise because of electoral competition, possible political coalitions between diﬀerent
groups lending their support to a speciﬁc party or group, or in extreme circumstances, because
diﬀerent groups can use their de facto power, such as in revolutions or in civil wars, to gain de
jure power (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a).
367A p p e n d i x
In this Appendix, we provide some of the technical details and results omitted from the text.
We start with the ﬁrst-order conditions that characterize the Pareto eﬃcient allocation. We
then discuss how randomizations can be allowed without changing the conclusions in the text.
7.1 First-Order Conditions
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the constrained eﬃcient allocation satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-
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for  = 0
These readily show that the consumption-labor marginal of the group in power is not




 0, this margin for groups not in power is distorted downwards (towards lower
labor supply).
377.2 Randomizations and Theorem 6
As discussed in the text, the maximization of (9) subject to (10), (11) and (12) is a potentially
non-convex one. If non-convexities are important, allowing for public randomizations would
improve the achievable value. In this part of the Appendix, we allow for such randomizations.
We show that randomizations do not aﬀect any of our major results, mainly because any
randomization will be over a ﬁnite number of (in fact two) allocations, and each allocation in
the support of the stochastic distribution induced by the randomizations will satisfy ﬁrst-order
conditions similar to those analyzed in the text. To establish this result, we will ﬁrst state a
generalized version of Theorem 1, which shows that the characterization of constrained Pareto
eﬃcient allocation takes a recursive form even when randomizations are allowed.
Formally, randomizations could be introduced by either considering correlated equilibria
or by explicitly introducing a publicly-observed randomization device. We pursue the second
strategy, since it allows for a tractable formulation in the context of the problem here.
Let us ﬁrst formulate a version of Proposition 1 with randomizations. In particular, let
C = {{ }





=1  and 0 ≤  ≤ ¯ } be the set of possible consumption-
labor allocations for diﬀerent groups, and let P∞ be the set of probability measures deﬁned
over the set C∞. Moreover, for each  and  ∈ ,l e t
¡
·|¢
∈ P∞ be a probability measure
over consumption-labor allocations for diﬀerent groups given history of power holdings .























-almost everywhere, for all  ∈  and all  =0 1




















for all  ∈ 
 and all  =0 1
We next assume that there exists an independently distributed uniform random variable 
publicly observed at each  before actions are taken. Consequently, actions can be conditioned
on . This implies that formally, the history  should now include  =( 0),a n di n
terms of Proposition 1, we should now condition on  =
¡
¢
. D e n o t et h es e to f’s by
 and partition this into 
1
, depending on which group is in power at time .O n c e
conditioning on this publicly-observed random variable is allowed, the maximization problem




































































⎠ for all  ∈ 
 and all  =0 1
Problem B allows for randomizations in the same way as Problem A, since allocations can
be conditioned on the realization of the random variable today and in all past dates. Any
solution to Problem A is a solution to Problem B and vice versa. Given this, our ﬁr s tr e s u l ti s
a generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 6 The constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocation with randomizations has a quasi-
Markovian structure whereby { ()  ()}








only on updated weights and the identity of the group in power.
39Proof. The proof follows similar lines to that of Theorem 1. In particular, with a similar











































 ()  ()
!#
subject to (25) and (26). By construction, solutions to Problem B and Problem C coincide.
The same argument as in the text establishes that Problem C has a recursive structure, where









=1 ( +  (−1))
and the identity of the group in power matter for future allocations.
Our next result states that the solution to Problem C will involve randomization using at
most two values.
Theorem 7 To characterize the Pareto eﬃcient allocations, it is suﬃcient to restrict 
¡
·|¢
for all  ∈  and for all  to have its support over two vectors of consumption, labor supply
and updated Pareto weights.
Proof. This theorem follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 in Appendix C of Acemoglu, Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2006).
In light of Theorem 7, we can consider the following simpliﬁed maximization problem,










































































40subject (10) and (11). In this problem,  =1and 2 correspond to possible randomizations








are the consumption and
labor supply levels for group  following history  into two possible events  =1and  =2 .
Here the  ¡
¢













for  =1and  =2 , and all the necessary conditions and the resulting downward
distortions apply for each case separately.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Part (a): Let α∗ be a vector of Pareto weights that correspond to the ﬁrst best allocations




Denote these allocations {∗
∗
}.L e t 
 (;) be the value of the worst equilibrium for




























and the right hand side goes to inﬁnity as  approaches one. Therefore there exists ¯  s.t. (17)
holds.
Part (b): Recall that  ≡ (),w h e r e ∈ ∆−1 are ex ante weights and  ∈ N ≡
{1}.L e t = ∆−1 ×N and S be the Borel -algebra over .
Our model implies that each  is deterministically mapped into 0 = ().T h u s t h e









0 if 0 6= ()
(0 | ) if 0 = ()
41Note that (()(00)) is uniformly bounded above by max0∈N (0 | )  1 (the latter














Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, Exercise 11.4f (which is straightforward to see) shows that if there










for all  ∈  and  ∈ S, then Doeblin’s condition is satisﬁed. Almost sure convergence to an












=1.I tr e m a i n s








=1 is non-degenerate. Suppose, to







.S i n c eﬁr s tb e s ti sn o t
sustainable, there must exists some party  for which sustainability constraint (12) is binding
























is the allocations in the invariant distribution. Choose any 0 and 
as in Theorem 2. Since there is a positive probability that party  remains in power for 

























=1 converges to nondegenerate dis-
tribution.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Without loss of generality assume that  =1 . If constraint (12) does not bind, the result follows
























1.T h e ni t















































where { ()  ()}
2
=1 is a solution to the maximization problem
max
{}
(1 + )1 (1 1)+22 (2 2) − 1 (2)
subject to
1 + 2 ≤ 1 + 2







≥ 1 [∗] for all .I fw eh a v et h a tf o ra n y such
that (1 + )(1 + )  ∗
1, the following is true
1(1 () 1 ()) − 1(2 ())  1 (∗
1∗
1) − 1 (∗
2),
then (20) would immediately imply (27) cannot hold with equality, thus leading to a contradic-
tion and establishing the desired result. Thus to complete the proof of lemma, we will establish
the following claim:
Claim 1 For any ∆ such that (1 + ∆)(1 + ∆)  ∗
1, we have that
1(1 (∆) 1 (∆)) − 1(2 (∆))  1 (∗
1∗
1) − 1 (∗
2)
We will ﬁrst proof some intermediate results. Let us adopt the following simpler notation




and  ( )=
( )

and similarly denote second order derivatives. Sometimes we will also drop ( ) and use
notation  , etc., whenever there is no confusion.
Claim 2 Let (∆;) and (∆) be the solution to the problem
 (∆;)=m a x

(1 + ∆)1(1 1)+22(2 2) − ∆1(2)
subject to
1 + 2 ≤ 1 + 2
43Then
1(1 (∆) 1 (∆)) − 1(2 (∆)) (28)
is increasing in ∆.















































































2)), which establishes (28).
Claim 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then for any Pareto weight ∗ and for any
∆ ∈ [0 ∗
1∗





and 2∆ =1− 1∆. Consider the maximization problem
Ω(∆)=m a x

(1∆ + ∆)1(1 1)+2∆2(2 2) − ∆1(2) (29)
subject to
1 + 2 ≤ 1 + 2
Denote { (∆)  (∆)} the solution to this problem. Then
 (∆) ≡ 1 (1 (∆) 1 (∆)) − 1 (2 (∆)) (30)
is increasing in ∆ Moreover, for any ∆  0  (∆) (0).
Proof. Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions to the maximization problem in (29). Assump-
tion 3 implies that 1 (∆)=1  The other ﬁrst-order conditions are





2 (2 (∆) − 2 (2 (∆)))
=1− 0
2 (2 (∆)) (32)
and










Substitute (34) into (31) to get
∗
11 (1 (∆) − 1(1)) = ∗
22 (2 (∆) − 2 (2 (∆))) (35)








































































































The expression in the brackets is negative, therefore 0 (∆) has the opposite sign of 2
∆.
The desired result follows from 2
∆ ≤ 0, which we establish next.

































































































































































Finally, from the deﬁnition of ∆,w eh a v e



























2∆ is increasing in ∆ Therefore from (39) ∆00  ∆0 implies 00
2 ≤ 0
2, completing the proof of
the claim.
46It remains to show that if ∆0 =0for any ∆00  0  (∆00) (∆0) Suppose that  (∆00)=
 (0) Previous analysis indicated that this is possible only if 00
2 = 0















We know that {0
 0
} is a solution to maximizing ∗
11 (1 1)+∗
2(2 2) subject to
1 + 2 ≤ 1 + 2 (40)
Since  are strictly convex, this solution is unique. Therefore, any {00
00















l e a d i n gt oac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
The next claim completes the proof of lemma. We state this claim for party 1; clearly, the
result is identical for party 2.
Claim 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Let { (∆)  (∆)}
2




(1 + ∆)1 (1 1)+22 (2 2) − ∆1 (2)
s.t.
1 + 2 ≤ 1 + 2






1(1 (∆) 1 (∆)) − 1(2 (∆))  1 (1 (∗0) 1 (∗0)) − 1 (2 (∗0)) (41)
Proof. Suppose 1  ∗
1.L e t˜ ∆ be such that


















)  1 (1 (∗0) 1 (∗0)) − 1 (2 (∗0)) (42)
47and from Claim 2,














If 1  ∗
1,s e t˜ ∆ =0and (42) follows from proof of Lemma 4.
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